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of her natural life or until she remarries"'" embodied within a divorce decree
were held to bind the husband's estate. In neither of the above Illinois
cases was there any express language that the alimony was to be a charge
against the deceased husband's estate.
In both Florida cases cited as being applicable in the instant case,
Allen v. Allen H and Undenvood v. Underwood,'5 there was a clear agree-
ment on the part of the husband to bind his personal representatives after
his death. In the instant case, however, it was held that the expressioni
"until her death or remarriage" in and of itself bound the husband's estate.
The majority of the court was not without support in their decision,",
but the dissent indicated that the stated expression could not bind the
estate of the husband unless the intent was expressly stated in the divorce
decree or could be implied from the surrounding circumstances.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions seem to agree on the law
involved. The difficulty arises in interpreting the intent of the parties as
expressed by the clause "until her death or remarriage" embodied within
the decree. The majority opinion implied an obligation upon the husband's
estate from the clause itself, rather than looking to the true intent of the
parties. It is submitted that the expression "until the death of the wife or
her remarriage" does not warrant such an interpretation. In order to bind
the husband's estate there should be an express written agreement between
the parties. Although this may prove harsh at times, it will eliminate future
litigation by compelling the parties to reduce their agreement to writing
where there is an actual intent to bind the husabud's estate.
MAX SPJEGELMAN
CRIMINAL LAW - CONSPIRACY 
- PARTICIPATION
OF STATE AGENT
The defendants were convicted of conspiring to violate gambling
statutes with one who was an agent of the County Solicitor and acting
in his official capacity to obtain evidence of such violations. Held, where
an essential part of a criminal act is to be performed by a government
agent acting in the line of duty, persons conspi.ring with such agent and
13. Ii re Estate kuclhenbecker, 4 I11. App.2d 314, 124 N.E.2d 52 (1955).
14. 111 Fla. 733, 150 So. 237 (1933) (where the agreement provided that in the
event the death of the husband before the death of his ex-wife, his heirs, executors,
and administrators should pay said alimony).
15. 64 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1953) (where it was provided in the decree that alimony
payments should continue during the life of the wife without any diminution or
cessation).
16. Cases cited note 11: sntpra.
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unaware of his official capacity may not be legally convicted of a co-nspiracy.
King v. State, 104 So.2d 730 (Fla. 1958).
- --While decisions on- this "point are relatively few,' the rule seems to
be 'that it is legally impossible to commit the crime of conspiracy with
one whose only purpose in entering into the agreement is to secure
evidence of violations of the law, and who is himself a necessary party in
the completion of the plan.2 In State v. Dougherty3 a detective employed
by the state attempted to secure evidence of corrupt practices by bribing
city officials to vote for certain ordinances. The New Jersey court held that
the alleged conspiracy of which defendants were tried and convicted had
no existence without the detective, who was a necessary party; and that
the State could not split the single conspiracy into two, making one
criminal and the other meritorious. In Weathered v. State4 defendants
were convicted of conspiracy to commit burglary. The Texas court reversed
on the ground that the only conspiracy shown was with a sheriff's agent
who had no criminal intent, hence there was no union or meeting of the
minds on the part of the sheriff's agent and the defendants. A Colorado
c6tirt,' in Connor v. People,6 reversed a conspiracy conviction where the
plan to rob a railroad originated with a detective (not an agent of the
State, but of the railroad) and had the consent of the owner of the
property. There was no unlawful act contemplated since there was consent
of the owner, and consequently there could be no conspiracy to do an
unlawful act.
The court stated:
... [W]hen, in their zeal, or under a mistaken sense of duty,
detectives suggest the commission of a crime, and instigate others
to take part in its commission in order to arrest them while in
the act, ... their conduct is not only reprehensible, but criminal
and ought to be rebuked, rather than encouraged, by the courts ....
The Seventh, Eighth and Ninth U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals have
reversed conspiracy convictions where: (1) prohibition agents went into
the whiskey selling business in order to obtain evidence of violation of
1. Most cases involving similar factual situations are decided on the. basis of the
entrapment doctrine. See 15 AM. JUR. Criminal Law § § 335-337 (1938);. 22 C.S.
Criminal Law § 45 (1940); 9 FLA. Jua. Criminal Law § 183 (1956); 6 FLORIDA LAw
AND PRACTICE Criminal Law § § 55-59 (1957).
..2:.O'Brien v. Uiiited States, 51 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1931); Note, 45 HARv..L.
REi. 381 (1931-1932); De Mayo v. United States, 32 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1929); Woo
Wai v. United States, 223 Fed. 412 (9th Cir. 1915); Connor v. People, 18 Colo: 373,
33 Pac. 159 (1893); State v. Dougherty, 88N.J.L. 209, 96 At]. 56-(1915); • Weathered
v. State, 128 Tex. Grim. 263, 81 S.W.2d 91 (1935); Woodworth v. State, 20 Tex.
Grim. 375. (1886)- 11 AM. Jua. Conspiracy § 24 (1937); 15 C.J.S. Conspiracy § 50
(1939);-Annot., 1 A.L.R. 158 (1922); 1 BIsHoP, CRIMINAL LAw § 926 z.a, (9th ed.
1923).
3. 88 N.J.L. 209, 96 At. 56 (1Q15).:
4. 128 Tex. Grim. 263, 81 S.W.2d 91 (1935).
5. 18 Colo. 373, 33 Pac. 159 (1893).
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the prohibition statute;6 (2) a government agent actually performed the
overt act of introducing liquor into forbidden territory; and (3) a govern-
ment agent induced defendants into entering into a plan to violate
immigration laws.8 In Ventimiglia v. United States,' although not a case
involving a government agent, the court found it legally impossible to
convict of conspiracy where the act which defendants agreed to do was
not unlawful, even though defendant may have thought so. The court
stated:
: . - A legal impossibility might . . . be termed an inherent
impossibility, in that the act, though consummated, would not
be criminal, and consequently an attempt or agreement to commit
it would also not be ....
Distinctions have arisen in cases where the conspiracy charged and
proved was not only with the government agent but also with others,
or the government agent did not originate the criminal plan, but merely
afforded an opportunity to defendants.' In Jung Quey v. United States"
the conspiracy proved originated with the defendants and the only
participation of the government was in asking the quartermaster of a ship
to remove opium from the ship in order that defendants might be caught
delivering it. In Commonwealth v. XVasson' 2 the Pennsylvania court found
no legal impossibility in a conspiracy conviction where three councilmen
conspired among themselves as well as with two detectives to accept bribes
for passing certain ordinances. The court also discussed distinctions between
measures used to entrap and "artifice" used to detect persons suspected
of being engaged in crime.' 3 In Johnson v. State 4 the defendant entered
into an agreement with another to burglarize a store. Subsequently, the
owners of the store hired a detective who joined the conspiracy in order
to catch the defendant. The court held that the conspiracy was complete
prior to the entry of the detective into the plan, and that conviction of
conspiracy is only precluded where the original design is suggested by the
detective. The conviction was reversed on other grounds, however.
6. O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1931) [finding government
was estopped to convict of conspiracy tinder those circumstances, citing Woodworth
v. State, 20 Tex. Crim. 375 (1886)1; note, 45 HARV. L. Rav. 381 (1931-1932).
7. De Mayo v. United States, 32 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1929) [holding acts of
government agent cannot be imputed to defendants since there is no community of
purpose, and since defendant did not perform any overt act himself there was no con-
spiracy].
8. Woo Wai v. United States, 223 Fed. 412 (9th Cir. 1915) [holding defendants
could not be held for conspiracy to violate the law since the government intended to
prevent consummation of the offense]; Sam Yick v. United States, 240 Fed. 60 (9th
Cir. 1917).
9. 242 F.2d 620 (4th Cir. 1957); Case Comment, Impossibility in Conspiracy,
15 WASH. & Lee, L, Rrv. 122 (1958).
10. Jung Quey v. United States, 222 Fed. 766 (9th Cir. 1915); Commonwealth
v. Wasson, 42 Pa. Super. 38 (1910); Johnson v. State, 3 Tex. Crim. 590 (1878).
11. 222 Fed. 766 (9th Cir. 1915).
12. 42 Pa. Super. 38 (1910).
13. Id. at 57.
14. 3 Tex. Crim. 590 (1878).
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The instant case is one of first impression in Florida. The court
examined the facts and found that, although the defendants had been
charged with conspiring with each other and with the County Solicitor's
agent, the only conspiracy shown by the evidence was a conspiracy with
the agent of the County Solicitor. In an effort to discover whether or not
police officers were acting corruptly, a hotel room was rented and set up
as a bookmaking establishment. A phone call was then made to the
police station complaining of gambling going on in the room, which
resulted in the arrival of two of the defendants (one of which was
acquitted by the jury). On their arrival, according to the testimony of
the government agent, an arrangement was entered into whereby the
defendants were to allow the agent to continue his bookmaking activities,
and the agent in turn was to pay a weekly sum to the defendants through
the mcdium of a third defendant, a taxicab driver. All expenses for the
room, gambling equipment, salary of the agent, and "pay-off" money
were supplied from public funds. Reasoning that the government agent
was to perform an act "essential to the crime charged as the object of
the conspiracy" and that there was no evidence tending to show that the
defendants conspired with each other, the court reversed the conviction and
remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. The court stated:
. . . We hold . . . that where two or more persons conspire with
another who is, unknown to them, a government agent acting in
the line of duty, to commit an offense under an agreement and
an intention that an essential ingredient of the offense is to be
performed by, and only by, such government agent, such persons
may not legally be convicted of a conspiracy .... 5
The court relied rather heavily on Woo Wai v. United States'8 and on the
Dougherty case' 7 in justifying its conclusion. United States v. Wray 8 was
distinguished from the instant case on the basis that in the Wray case
it was stated that there was evidence from which a jury could find that
the two defendants had conspired with one another as well as with the
government agent.
The court reached a socially preferred result in the instant case. It is
true that this decision undoubtedly will impose a heavier burden on those
whose duty it is to enforce the laws. The fact remains that in our system
of jurisprudence it would be unconscionable to allow the State, through
its agents, to entice citizens into conspiring with the State to commit
acts which the State denounces as criminal. It is not unreasonable to
require that law enforcement officers confine their activities to detecting
persons engaged in criminal activities, rather than actively soliciting others
to join them in crime.
BE-irrY LYNN LEE
15. King v. State, 104 So.2d 731, 733 (Fla. 1958).
16. 223 Fed. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
,/. 88 N.J.L, 209, 96 At0. 56 (1915).
16. 8 F.2d 429 (N.D. Ca. 1925).
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